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Precise analysis of pointer information plays an important role in many static analysis techniques
and tools today. The precision, however, must be balanced against the scalability of the analysis.
This paper focusses on improving the precision of standard context and flow insensitive alias anal-
ysis algorithms at a low scalability cost. In particular, we present a semantics-preserving program
transformation that drastically improves the precision of existing analyses when deciding if a pointer
can alias NULL. Our program transformation is based on Global Value Numbering, a scheme in-
spired from compiler optimizations literature. It allows even a flow-insensitive analysis to make
use of branch conditions such as checking if a pointer is NULL and gain precision. We perform
experiments on real-world code to measure the overhead in performing the transformation and the
improvement in the precision of the analysis. We show that the precision improves from 86.56% to
98.05%, while the overhead is insignificant.
Keywords: Alias Analysis, Global Value Numbering, Static Single Assignment
1 Introduction
Null-pointer exceptions directly affect software reliability because such exceptions can bring down the
application. Detecting and eliminating these bugs is an important step towards developing reliable sys-
tems. Static analysis tools that look for null-pointer exceptions typically employ techniques based on
alias analysis to detect possible aliasing between pointers. Two pointer-valued variables are said to
alias if they hold the same memory location during runtime. Aliasing can be decided in two ways: (a)
may-alias [1], where two pointers are said to may-alias if they can point to the same memory location
under some possible execution, and (b) must-alias [28], where two pointers must-alias if they always
point to the same memory location under all possible executions. Because a precise alias analysis is
undecidable [24] and even a flow-insensitive pointer analysis is NP-hard [14], much of the research in
the area plays on the precision-efficiency trade-off of alias analysis. For example, practical algorithms
for may-alias analysis lose precision (but retain soundness) by over-approximating: a verdict that two
pointer may-alias does not imply that there is some execution in which they actually hold the same value.
Whereas, a verdict that two pointers cannot may-alias must imply that there is no execution in which they
hold the same value.
We use a sound may-alias analysis in an attempt to prove the safety of a program with respect to
null-pointer exceptions. For each pointer dereference, we ask the analysis if the pointer can may-alias
NULL just before the dereference. If the answer is that it cannot, then the pointer cannot hold a NULL
value under all possible executions, hence the dereference is safe. The more precise the analysis, the
more dereferences it can prove safe. This paper demonstrates a technique that improves the precision of
may-alias analysis at little cost when answering aliasing queries of pointers with the NULL value.
2 Precise Null Pointer Analysis through Global Value Numbering
The NULL value is special because programmers tend to be defensive against null-pointer excep-
tions. If there is doubt that a pointer, say x, can be NULL or not, the programmer would use a check
“if (x 6= NULL)” before dereferencing x. Existing alias analysis techniques, especially flow insensitive
techniques for may-alias analysis, ignore all branch conditions. As we demonstrate in this paper, ex-
ploiting these defensive checks can significantly increase the precision of alias analysis. Our technique
is based around a semantics-preserving program transformation and requires only a minor change to the
alias analysis algorithm itself.
Program transformations have been used previously to improve the precision for alias analysis. For
instance, it is common to use a Single Static Assignment (SSA) conversion [6] before running flow-
insensitive analyses. The use of SSA automatically adds some level of flow sensitivity to the analysis
[12]. SSA, while useful, is still limited in the amount of precision that it adds, and in particular, it
does not help with using branch conditions. We present a program transformation based on Global
Value Numbering (GVN) [16] that adds significantly more precision on top of SSA by leveraging branch
conditions.
The transformation works by first inserting an assignment v := e on the then branch of a check
if (e 6= NULL), where v is a fresh program variable. This gives us the global invariant that v can never
hold the NULL value. However, this invariant will be of no use unless the program uses v. Our transfor-
mation then searches locally, in the same procedure, for program expressions e′ that are equivalent to e,
that is, at runtime they both hold the same value. The transformation then replaces the use of e′ with v.
The search for equivalent expressions is done by adapting the GVN algorithm (originally designed for
compiler optimizations [10]).
Our transformation can be followed with a standard alias analysis to infer the points-to set for each
variable, with a slight change that the new variables introduced by our transformation (such as v above)
cannot be NULL. This change stops spurious propagation of NULL and makes the analysis more precise.
We perform extensive experiments on real-world code. The results show that the precision of the alias
analysis (measured in terms of the number of pointer dereferences proved safe) goes from 86.56% to
98.05%. This work is used inside Microsoft’s Static Driver Verifier tool [22] for finding null-pointer
bugs in device drivers1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background on flow-insensitive
alias analysis and how SSA can improve its precision. Section 3 illustrates our program transformation
via an example and Section 4 presents it formally. Section 5 presents experimental results, Section 6
describes some of the related work in the area and Section 7 concludes. Finally, Appendix A proves that
the transformation preserves program semantics.
2 Background
2.1 Programming Language
We introduce a simplistic language to demonstrate the alias analysis and how program transformations
can be used to increase its precision. As is standard, we concern ourselves only with statements that
manipulate pointers. All other statements are ignored (i.e., abstracted away) by the alias analysis. Our
language has assignments with one of the following forms: pointer assignments x := y, dereferencing via
field writes x.f := y and reads x := y.f , creating new memory locations x := new(), or assigning NULL
as x := NULL. The language also has assume and assert statements:
1https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/mt779102(v=vs.85).aspx
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var x : int
procedure f(var y : int) returns u : int
{
var z : int
L1 :
x :=y.f;
assume (x 6=Null);
goto L2;
L2 :
z.g :=y;
assert (x 6=Null);
u :=x;
return;
}
procedure main()
{
var a : int;
var b : int;
L1 :
a :=new();
b :=call f(a);
goto L2;
L2 :
return;
}
Figure 1: An example program in our language
• assume B checks the Boolean condition B and continues execution only if the condition evaluates
to true. The assume statement is a convenient way of modeling branching in most existing source
languages. For instance, a branch “if (B)” can be modeled using two basic blocks, one beginning
with assume B and the other with assume ¬B.
• assert B checks the Boolean condition B and continues execution if it holds. If B does not hold,
then it raises an assertion failure and stops program execution.
A program in our language begins with global variable declarations followed by one or more proce-
dures. Each procedure starts with declarations of local variables, followed by a sequence of basic blocks.
Each basic block starts with a label, followed by a list of statements, and ends with a control transfer,
which is either a goto or a return. A goto in our language can take multiple labels. The choice between
which label to jump is non-deterministic. Finally, we disallow loops in the control-flow of a procedure;
they can instead be encoded using procedures with recursion. This restriction simplifies the presentation
of our algorithms. Figure 1 shows an illustrative example in our language.
2.2 Alias Analysis
This section describes Andersen’s may-alias analysis [1]. The analysis is context and flow-insensitive,
which means that it completely abstracts away control of the program. But the analysis is field-sensitive,
which means that a value can be obtained by reading a field f only if it was previously written to the
same field f. Field-insensitive analyses, for example, also abstract away the field name.
The analysis outputs an over-approximation of the set of memory locations each pointer can hold
under all possible executions. Since a program can potentially execute indefinitely (because of loops or
recursion), the number of memory locations allocated by a program can be unbounded. We consider
a finite abstraction of memory locations, commonly called the allocation-site abstraction [15]. Each
memory location allocated by the same new statement is represented using the same abstract value. An
abstract value is also called an allocation site. We label each new statement with a unique number i and
refer to its corresponding allocation site as aSi. We use the special allocation site aS0 to denote NULL.
We follow a description of Andersen’s analysis in terms of set constraints [26], shown in Figure 2.
The analysis outputs a points-to relation pt where pt(x) represents the points-to set of a variable x,
i.e. (an over-approximation of) the set of allocation sites that x may hold under all possible executions.
4 Precise Null Pointer Analysis through Global Value Numbering
Statement Constraint
i : x := new() aSi ∈ pt(x)
x := NULL aS0 ∈ pt(x)
x := y pt(y)⊆ pt(x)
x := y.f
aSi ∈ pt(y)
pt(aSi.f)⊆ pt(x)
x.f := y
aSi ∈ pt(x)
pt(y)⊆ pt(aSi.f)
Figure 2: Program statements and
corresponding points-to set constraints
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for computing points-to sets
1: For each program variable x, let pt(x) = /0
2: repeat
3: opt := pt
4: for all program statements st do
5: if st is i : x := new() then
6: pt(x) := pt(x)∪{aSi}
7: if st is x := NULL then
8: pt(x) := pt(x)∪{aS0}
9: if st is x := y then
10: pt(x) := pt(x)∪ pt(y)
11: if st is x := y.f then
12: for all aSi ∈ pt(y) do
13: pt(x) := pt(x)∪ pt(aSi.f)
14: if st is x.f := y then
15: for all aSi ∈ pt(x) do
16: pt(aSi.f) := pt(aSi.f)∪ pt(y)
17: for all tagged(x) do
18: pt(x) := pt(x)−{aS0}
19: until opt = pt
In addition, it also computes pt(aSi.f), for each allocation site aSi and field f, representing (an over-
approximation of) the set of values written to the f field of an object represented by aSi.
The analysis abstracts away program control along with assert and assume statements. It essentially
considers a program as a bag of pointer-manipulating statements where any statement can be executed
any number of times and in any order. For each statement, the analysis follows Figure 2 to generate a set
of rules that define constraints on the points-to solution pt. The rules can be read as follows.
• If a program has an allocation x := new() and this statement is labelled with the unique integer i,
then the solution must have aSi ∈ pt(x).
• If a program has the statement x := NULL, then it must be that aS0 ∈ pt(x).
• If the program has an assignment x := y then the solution must have pt(y)⊆ pt(x), because xmay
hold any value that y can hold.
• If the program has a statement x := y.f and aSi ∈ pt(y), then it must be that pt(aSi.f) ⊆ pt(x)
because x may hold any value written to the f field of aSi.
• If the program has a statement x.f := y and aSi ∈ pt(x) then it must be that pt(y)⊆ pt(aSi.f).
These set constraints can be solved using a simple fix-point iteration, shown in Algorithm 1. (Our
tool uses a more efficient implementation [26].) For now, ignore the loop on line 17. Once the solution
is computed, we check all assertions in the program. We say that an assertion assert (x 6= NULL) is safe
(i.e., the assertion cannot be violated) if aS0 6∈ pt(x). We do not consider other kinds of assertions in the
program because our goal is just to show null-exception safety. Andersen’s analysis complexity is cubic
in the size of the program, and for k-sparse programs, the wor
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2.3 Static Single Assignment (SSA)
This section shows how a program transformation can improve the precision of an alias analysis. Con-
sider the following program.
x := new();
assert (x 6= Null);
y := x.f;
x := Null;
A flow-insensitive analysis does not look at the order of statements. Under this abstraction, the analysis
cannot prove the safety of the assertion in the above snippet of code because it does not know that the
assignment of NULL to x only happens after the assertion.
To avoid such loss in precision, most practical implementations of alias analysis use the Single Static
Assignment (SSA) form [6]. Roughly, SSA introduces multiple copies of each original variable such
that each variable in the new program only has a single assignment. The following is the SSA form of
the snippet shown in the beginning of this section.
x1 := new();
assert (x1 6= Null);
y := x1.f;
x2 := Null;
Clearly, this program has the same semantics as the original program. But a flow-insensitive analysis
will now be able to show the safety of the assertion in the program because the assignment of NULL is
to x2 whereas the assertion is on x1.
3 Overview
This section presents an overview of our technique of using stronger program transformations that add
even more precision to the alias analysis compared to the standard SSA. We start by using Common
Subexpression Elimination [5] and build towards using Global Value Numbering [16], which is used in
our implementation and experiments.
3.1 Common Subexpression Elimination
We demonstrate how we can leverage assume and assert statements to add precision to the analysis.
Consider the following program.
assume (x 6= Null);
y := x;
assert (x 6= Null);
z := x.f;
Once the program control passes the assume statement, we know that x cannot point to NULL, hence the
assertion is safe, irrespective of what preceded this code snippet. Note that SSA renaming does not help
prove the assertion in this case (it is essentially a no-op for the above snippet). We now make the case
for a different program transformation.
6 Precise Null Pointer Analysis through Global Value Numbering
As a first step, we introduce a new local variable cseTmp# to the procedure and assign it the value of
x right after the assume. These new variables that we introduce to the program will carry the tag “#” to
distinguish them from other program variables. For a tagged variable w#, we say that tagged(w#) is true.
These tagged variables carry the special invariant that they cannot be NULL; their only assignment will
be after an assume statement that prunes away the NULL value.
After introducing the variable cseTmp#, we make use of a technique similar to Common Subexpres-
sion Elimination (CSE) to replace all expressions that are equivalent to cseTmp# with the variable itself,
resulting in the following program:
assume (x 6= Null);
cseTmp# := x;
y := cseTmp#;
assert (cseTmp# 6= Null);
z := cseTmp#.g;
This snippet is clearly equivalent to the original one. We perform the alias analysis on this snippet as
usual, but enforce that pt(cseTmp#) cannot have aS0 because it cannot be NULL. (See the loop on line
17 of Algorithm 1.) The analysis can now prove that the assertion is safe.
The process of finding equivalent expressions is not trivial. For instance, consider the following
program where we have introduced the variable cseTmp#.
assume (x.f 6= Null);
cseTmp# := x.f;
y.f := z;
z := x.f;
In the last assignment, x.f cannot be substituted by cseTmp#, because there is an assignment to the
field f in the previous statement. As there is no aliasing information present at this point, we have to
conservatively assume that y and x could be aliases, thus, the assignment y.f := z can potentially change
the value of x.f, breaking its equivalence to cseTmp#.
3.2 Global Value Numbering
We improve upon the previous transformation by using a stronger method of determining expression
equalities. The methodology remains the same: we introduce temporary variables that cannot be NULL
and use them to replace syntactically equivalent expressions. But this time we adapt the Global Value
Numbering (GVN) scheme to detect equivalent expressions. Consider the following program. (For now,
ignore the right-hand side of the figure after the =⇒.)
1 y := x.f.g; =⇒ t1 ← x, t2 ← t1.f, t3 ← t2.g, y← t3
2 z := y.h; =⇒ t3 ← y, t4 ← t3.h, z← t4
3 assume (z 6= Null); =⇒ set t4 ∈ {nonNullExprs}
4 a := x.f; =⇒ t1 ← x, t2 ← t1.f, a← t2
5 b := a.g.h; =⇒ t2 ← a, t3 ← t2.g, t4 ← t3.h, b← t4
6 assert (b 6= Null); =⇒ check t4 ∈ {nonNullExprs}
7 c.g := d;
It is clear that z and b are equivalent at the assertion location, and since z 6= NULL, the assertion is safe.
However, none of the previous methods would allow us to prove the safety of the assertion. We adapt
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the GVN scheme to help us establish the equality between z and b. We introduce the concept of terms
that will be used as a placeholder for subexpressions. The intuitive idea is that equivalent subexpressions
will be represented using the same term.
We start by giving an overview of the transformation for a single basic block, and then generalize
it to full procedure later in this section. For a single basic block, we walk through the statements in
order and as we encounter a new variable, we assign it a new term and remember this mapping in a
dictionary called hashValue. We also store the mapping from terms to other terms through operators
in a separate dictionary called hashFunction. For example, if x is assigned term t1, and we encounter
the assignment y := x.f, we store hashFunction[f][t1] = t2 and assign the term t2 to y. We also maintain
a separate list nonNullExprs of terms that are not null. Finally, for performing the actual substitution,
we maintain a dictionary defaultVar that maps terms to the temporary variables that we introduce for
non-null expressions.
We go through the program snippet starting at the first statement and move down to the last statement.
At statement i, we follow the description written in the ith item below. This description is also shown on
the right side of the program snippet, after the =⇒ arrow.
1. Assign a new term t1 to x, and set hashValue[x] = t1. Then, set hashFunction[f][t1] = t2, and
hashFunction[g][t2] = t3. Finally the assignment to y adds hashValue[y] = t3.
2. We already have hashValue[y] = t3, so assign hashFunction[g][t3] = t4. The assignment adds
hashValue[z] = t4.
3. We have hashValue[z] = t4. So, we add t4 to nonNullExprs. We create a new temporary variable
gvnTmp#, and construct an extra assignment gvnTmp# := z, and add it after the assume statement.
Because hashValue[z] = t4, we also add defaultVar[t4] = gvnTmp
#, which we will use later for
substitutions to all expressions that hash to t4.
4. We already have hashValue[x] = t1 and hashFunction[f][t1] = t2, so we add hashValue[a] = t2.
5. We have hashValue[a] = t2, hashFunction[g][t2] = t3 and hashFunction[h][t3] = t4. Hence, the
hash value of the expression a.g.h is t4. We also have defaultVar[t4] = gvnTmp
#. At this point,
we observe t4 being in nonNullExprs and substitute the RHS a.g.h with gvnTmp
#. Finally, we add
hashValue[b] = t4.
6. Because hashValue[b] = t4 and defaultVar[t4] = gvnTmp
# and nonNullExprs contains t4, we re-
place the expression b with gvnTmp#.
The resulting code is shown below.
1 y := x.f.g;
2 z := y.h;
3 assume (z 6= Null);
4 gvnTmp# := z;
5 a := x.f;
6 b := gvnTmp#;
7 assert (gvnTmp# 6= Null);
8 c.g := d;
Clearly, we retain the invariant that #-tagged variables cannot be NULL, and it is now straightforward
to prove the safety of the assertion. We also note that the expression substitution is performed in a
conservative manner. It is aborted as soon as a subexpression is assigned to. For example, at line 8, we
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encounter an assignment to the field g, so we remove g from the dictionary hashFunction. This has the
effect of g acting as a new field, and all terms referenced by this field will now be assigned new terms.
The above transformation, in general, is performed on the entire procedure, not just a basic block to
fully exploit its potential. This occurs in two steps. First, loops are lifted and converted to procedures
(with recursion), so that the control-flow of each resulting procedure is acyclic. Next, we perform a
topological sort [2] of the basic blocks of a procedure and analyze the blocks in this order. This ensures
that by the time the algorithm visits a basic block, it has already processed all predecessors of the block.
When analyzing a block, the algorithm considers all its predecessors and takes the intersection of
their nonNullExprs list and hashValue map. This is because an expression is non-null only if it is non-
null in all its predecessors and, further, we can use a term for a variable only if it is associated with the
same term in all its predecessors. Finally, an important aspect of the algorithm is to perform a sound
substitution at the merge point of two basic blocks. Consider the code snippet below.
L1 :
assume (x 6= Null);
gvnTmp#1 := x;
goto L3;
L2 :
assume (x 6= Null);
gvnTmp#2 := x;
goto L3;
L3 :
assert (x 6= Null);
In this example, although x is available as a non-null expression in L3, we cannot substitute x in the
assertion by either gvnTmp#1 or gvnTmp
#
2 because neither preserves program semantics. Instead, we
introduce a new variable gvnTmp#3 and add the assignment gvnTmp
#
3 := x right before the assertion in L3
and use that for substituting x. This is achieved by the map var2expr in the main algorithm. It maps the
current block and the #-tagged variable to the expression it will substitute for. In the above program, let’s
say we assign the term t to the non-null expression x. Hence, nonNullExprs[L1] and nonNullExprs[L2]
both contain t. We also have defaultVar[L1][t] = gvnTmp#1 and var2expr[gvnTmp
#
1] = x. Since t is
available from all predecessors of L3, we know that this term is non-null in L3. The question is finding
the expression corresponding to this term and introducing a new assignment for it. At this point, the map
var2expr comes into play. We pick a predecessor of L3, say L1. We look for the default variable of t and
find defaultVar[L1][t] = gvnTmp#1, we then search for var2expr[gvnTmp
#
1] = x. At this point, we find
that the expression corresponding to term t is x, and we introduce a new assignment gvnTmp#3 := x at the
start of L3 and use this for substitution of x. With these motivating examples, the next section describes
the algorithm formally.
4 Algorithm
We present the pseudocode of our program transformation in this section (Algorithms 2 and 3). The
transformation takes a program as input and produces a semantically equivalent program with new #-
tagged variables that can never be NULL. This involves adding assignments for these new variables, and
substituting existing expressions with these variables whenever we determine that the substitution will
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm to perform GVN
1: nonNullExprs = {} ⊲ block→ non-null terms in block
2: var2expr = {} ⊲ #-tagged variable→ expression
3: defaultVar = {} ⊲ block, term→ variable for substitution
4: hashValue = {} ⊲ block, variable→ term
5: hashFunction = {} ⊲ operator, terms→ term
6: currBlock ⊲ current block
7: function DOGVN
8: for proc in program do
9: for block in proc.Blocks do
10: for stmt in block.Stmts do
11: if stmt is “assert expr 6= NULL” or “assume expr 6= NULL” then
12: gvnTmp# ← GetNewSpecialVar()
13: s← “gvnTmp# := expr”
14: block.Stmts.Add(s)
15: var2expr[block][gvnTmp# ]← expr
16: for proc in program do
17: sortedBlocks← TopologicalSort(proc.Blocks)
18: for block in sortedBlocks do
19: nonNullExprs[block]←
⋂
blk∈block.Preds nonNullExprs[blk]
20: hashValue[block]←
⋂
blk∈block.Preds hashValue[blk]
21: currBlock← block
22: for term in nonNullExprs[block] do
23: expr← var2expr[defaultVar[blk][term]] ⊲ for some blk ∈ block.Preds
24: gvnTmp# ← GetNewSpecialVar()
25: var2expr[gvnTmp# ]← expr
26: s← “gvnTmp# := expr”
27: block.Stmts.Add(s)
28: for stmt in block.Stmts do
29: stmt← ProcessStmt(stmt)
30: if stmt is “gvnTmp# := expr” then
31: term←ComputeHash(expr)
32: nonNullExprs[block].Add(term)
33: defaultVar[block][term]← gvnTmp#
At a high level, the idea is to use assume and assert statements to identify non-null expressions. We
introduce fresh #-tagged variables and assign these non-null expressions to them. Then, in a second pass,
we compute a term corresponding to each expression. These terms are assigned in a manner that if two
expressions have the same term, then they are equivalent to each other. If we encounter an expression
e with the same term as one of the non-null expressions e′, we substitute e with the #-tagged variable
corresponding to e′.
We start by describing the role of each data structure used in Algorithm 2.
• nonNullExprs: For each block, this stores the terms of non-null expressions for that block.
• var2expr: This maps a #-tagged variable to the expression it is assigned to in each block. This will
be used to solve the issue discussed in the last example of Section 3.2.
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• defaultVar: This maps the term corresponding to an expression to the #-tagged variable that will be
used for its substitution. Whenever we compute the term for an expression, if the term is present
in nonNullExprs, we will use defaultVar to find the #-tagged variable that is going to be used for
the substitution.
• hashValue: It stores the term assigned to each variable in a particular block.
• hashFunction: It stores the mapping from a field and a term to a new term. It is used to store the
term for expressions with fields.
• currBlock: It keeps track of the current block and is used while calling the helper functions.
We now explain the algorithm step by step.
1. Lines 8 - 15 – In this first pass of the algorithm, we search for program statements of the form
“assert expr 6= NULL” or “assume expr 6= NULL”. This guarantees that expr cannot be NULL after
this program location under all executions. Hence, we introduce a new variable gvnTmp# and
assign expr to it. This mapping is also added to var2expr.
2. Line 17 – Before doing the second pass, we perform a topological sort on the blocks according to
the control flow graph. This is necessary since we need the information of nonNullExprs for the
predecessors of a basic block before analyzing it. Note that conflow-flow graphs of procedures in
our language must be acyclic (we convert loops to recursion), thus a topological sorting always
succeeds.
3. Lines 18 - 27 – We compute the set of expressions that are non-null in all predecessors. Only these
expressions will be non-null in the current block. We also need the term for each variable in the
current block, which also comes from the intersection of terms from all predecessors. Finally, for
all the non-null expressions, we add an assignment since these expressions may be available from
different variables in different predecessors, as discussed in Section 3.2.
4. Lines 28 - 33 – Finally, we process each statement in the current block. This performs the sub-
stitution for each expression in the statement (GetExpr function in Algorithm 3). GetExpr com-
putes the term for the expression (ComputeHash function in Algorithm 3), and if the term is con-
tained in nonNullExprs, the substitution is performed. Finally, if we encounter a store statement,
“v.f := expr”, we remove all mappings w.r.t. f in hashFunction. So, for the future statements (and
future blocks in the topological order), new terms will be assigned to expressions related to field f.
With this pseudocode, we will generate a semantically equivalent program, and as we show in our
experiments, will have improved precision with regard to alias analysis. The main reason behind this
improvement is that these #-tagged variables can never contain aS0 in the points-to set, hence aS0 cannot
flow through these variables in the analysis, while earlier, there was no such restriction and NULL could
flow freely. The pseudocode for the algorithm is demonstrated in Algorithms 2 and 3.
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Algorithm 3 Helper Functions for DoGVN
1: function PROCESSSTMT(stmt)
2: if stmt is “assume expr” or “assert expr” then
3: expr← GetExpr(expr)
4: return stmt
5: else if stmt is “v := expr” then
6: hashValue[currBlock][v]←ComputeHash(expr)
7: expr← GetExpr(expr)
8: return stmt
9: else if stmt is “v.f := expr” then
10: expr← GetExpr(expr)
11: v← GetExpr(v)
12: hashFunction.Remove(f)
13: return stmt
14: function GETEXPR(expr)
15: if expr is v then
16: term←ComputeHash(v)
17: if nonNullExprs[currBlock] contains term then
18: return defaultVar[currBlock][term]
19: return v
20: if expr is “v.f” then
21: v← GetExpr(v)
22: return “v.f”
23: function COMPUTEHASH(expr)
24: if expr is v then
25: if hashValue[currBlock] does not contain v then
26: hashValue[currBlock][v]← GetNewTerm()
27: return hashValue[currBlock][v]
28: else if expr is “v.f” then
29: term←ComputeHash(v)
30: if hashFunction[f] does not contain term then
31: hashFunction[f][term]← GetNewTerm()
32: return hashFunction[f][term]
5 Experimental Evaluation
We have implemented the algorithms presented in this paper for the Boogie language [19]. Boogie is an
intermediate verification language. Several front-ends are available that compile source languages (such
as C/C++ [17, 23] and C# [3]) to Boogie, making it a useful target for developing practical tools.
Our work fits into a broader verification effort. The Angelic Verification (AV) project2 at Microsoft
Research aims to design push-button technology for finding software defects. In an earlier effort, AV was
targeted to find null-pointer bugs [7]. Programs from the Windows codebase, in C/C++, were compiled
down to Boogie with assertions guarding every pointer access to check for null dereferences. These
2https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/angelic-verification/
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Stats SSA only SSA with GVN
Bench Procs KLOC Asserts Time(s) Asserts Time(s) GVN(s) Asserts
Mod 1 40 3.2 1741 9.08 61 11.37 0.88 17
Mod 2 37 8.4 4035 11.34 233 17.62 1.13 45
Mod 3 64 6.5 4375 10.26 617 19.43 2.15 52
Mod 4 184 20.9 7523 24.04 543 33.99 2.43 123
Mod 5 284 30.9 11184 35.02 1881 59.84 7.11 232
Mod 6 382 37.8 12128 35.94 2675 70.71 11.13 452
Mod 7 453 37.2 6840 36.88 1396 53.24 3.44 127
Mod 8 400 43.8 12209 28.91 2854 62.27 5.38 475
Mod 9 479 56.6 19030 60.05 5444 106.61 12.40 508
Mod 10 998 76.5 39955 171.43 2887 839.58 475.08 372
Mod 11 867 23.5 6966 49.17 875 69.10 10.14 103
Mod 12 303 14.9 8359 24.57 820 59.13 13.41 210
Mod 13 419 22.1 11471 38.27 869 87.07 24.03 248
Mod 14 493 36.2 18026 48.56 2501 149.60 41.93 478
Mod 15 317 19.4 20555 55.07 586 269.35 134.06 131
Mod 16 809 54.0 16957 62.86 2821 127.67 30.46 342
Total 6529 491.9 201354 701.45 27063 2036.58 775.16 3915
Table 1: Results showing the effect of SSA and GVN program transformations on the ability of alias
analysis to prove safety of non-null assertions.
Boogie programs were fed to a verification pipeline that applied heavyweight SMT-solver technology to
reason over all possible program behaviors. To optimize the verification time, an alias analysis is run at
the Boogie level to remove assertions that can be proved safe by the analysis. As our results will show,
this optimization is necessary. The alias analysis is based on Andersen’s analysis, as was described
in Figure 2. We follow the algorithm given in Sridharan et al.’s report [26] with the extra constraint
that #-tagged variables cannot alias with NULL, i.e. they cannot contain the allocation site aS0. We
can optionally perform the program transformation of Section 4 before running the alias analysis. Our
implementation is available open-source3 .
We evaluate the effect of our program transformation on the precision of alias analysis for checking
safety of null-pointer assertions. The benchmarks are described in the first four columns of Table 1.
We picked 16 different modules from the Windows codebase. The table lists an anonymized name for
the module (Bench), the number of procedures contained in the module (Procs), the lines of code in
thousands (KLOC) and the number of assertions (one per pointer dereference) in the code (Asserts). It
is worth noting that the first ten modules are the same as ones used in the study with AV [7], while the
rest were added later.
We execute our tool in two modes. In the first, we use SSA and then run the alias analysis algorithm.
In the second, we perform our GVN transformation on top of SSA and then run the alias analysis al-
gorithm. In each case, we list the total time taken by the tool (Time(s)), including the time to run the
transformation, and the number of assertions that were not proved safe (Asserts). In the case of GVN,
we also isolate and list the time taken by the GVN transformation itself (GVN(s)).
The experiments were run (sequentially, single-threaded) on a server class machine with an Intel(R)
Xeon(R) processor (single core) executing at 2.4 GHz with 32 GB RAM.
3At https://github.com/boogie-org/corral, project AddOns\AliasAnalysis
Ankush Das & Akash Lal 13
It is clear from the table that GVN offers significant increase in precision. With only the use of SSA,
the analysis was able to prove the safety of 86.56% of assertions, while with the GVN transformation, we
can prune away 98.05% of assertions. This is approximately a 7X reduction in the number of assertions
that remain. This pruning is surprising because the alias analysis is still context and flow insensitive.
Our program transformation crucially exploits the fact that programmers tend to be defensive against
null-pointer bugs, allowing the analysis to get away with a very coarse abstraction. In fact, this level of
pruning meant that any level of investment in making the analysis more sophisticated (e.g., flow sensitive)
would have very diminished returns.
The alias analysis itself scales quite well: it finishes on about half a million lines of code in approxi-
mately 700 seconds with just SSA (86.56% pruning) or 2000 seconds with GVN (98.05% pruning). We
note that there is an increase in the running time when using GVN. This happens because the transfor-
mation introduces more variables, compared to just SSA. However, this increase in time is more than
offset by the improvement presented to the AV toolchain. For example, with the GVN transformation,
AV takes 11 hours to finish the first 10 modules, whereas with the SSA transformation alone it does not
finish even in 24 hours. Furthermore, AV reports fewer bugs when using just SSA because the extra
computational efforts translate to a loss in program coverage as timeouts are hit more frequently.
6 Related Work
Pointer analysis is a well-researched branch of static analysis. There are several techniques proposed
that interplay between context, flow and field sensitivity. Our choice of using context-insensitive, flow-
insensitive but field sensitive analysis is to pick a scalable starting point, after which we add precision at
low cost. The distinguishing factor in our work is: (1) the ability to leverage information from assume
and assert statements (or branch conditions) and (2) specializing for the purpose of checking non-null
assertions (as opposed to general aliasing assertions). We very briefly list, in the rest of this section, some
of the previous work in adding precision to alias analysis or making it more scalable.
Context Sensitivity. Sharir and Pnueli [25] introduced the concept of call-strings to add context-
sensitivity to static analysis techniques. Call strings may grow extremely long and limit efficiency,
so Lhota´k and Hendren [21] used k-limiting approaches to limit the size of call strings. Whaley and
Lam [29] instead use Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) to scale a context sensitive analysis.
Flow sensitivity. Hardekopf and Lin [11] present a staged flow-sensitive analysis where a less precise
auxiliary pointer analysis computes def-use chains which is used to enable the sparsity of the primary
flow-sensitive analysis. The technique is quite scalable on large benchmarks but they abstract away the
assume statements. De and D’Souza [8] compute a map from access paths to sets of abstract objects
at each program statement. This enables them to perform strong updates at indirect assignments. The
technique is shown to be scalable only for small benchmarks, moreover, they also abstract away all
assume statements. Finally, Lerch et al. [20] introduce the access-path abstraction, where access paths
rooted at the same base variable are represented by this base variable at control flow merge points. The
technique is quite expensive even on small benchmarks (less than 25 KLOC) and do not deal with assume
statements in any way.
Other techniques. Heintze and Tardieu [13] improved performance by using a demand-driven pointer
analysis, computing sufficient information to only determine points-to set of query variables. Fink et
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al. [9] developed a staged verification system, where faster and naive techniques run as early stages to
prune away assertions that are easier to prove, which then reduces the load on more precise but slow tech-
niques that run later. Landi and Ryder [18] use conditional may alias information to over-approximate
the points-to sets of each pointer. Context sensitivity is added using k-limiting approach, and a set of
aliases is maintained for every statement within a procedure to achieve flow-sensitivity. Choi et al. [4]
also follows [18] closely but uses sparse representations for the control flow graphs and use transfer
functions instead of alias-generating rules. To the best of our knowledge, none of these techniques are
able to leverage assume statements to improve precision.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a program transformation that improves the efficiency of alias analysis with minor
scalability overhead. The transformation is proved to be semantics preserving. Our evaluation demon-
strates the merit of our approach on a practical end-to-end scenario of finding null-pointer dereferences
in software.
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A Proof of Correctness
We sketch the proof of the fact that our transformation preserves semantics. To substitute an expression,
say expr with a variable, say v at a program location L, we need to prove the following two conditions.
• Assignment of v reaches L along every execution path.
• expr and v evaluate to the same value at L under all possible executions.
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A.1 First Condition
We begin by proving the first condition. Note that substitution only occurs in the function GetExpr(),
(line 18 in Algorithm 3) and only by variables present in the map de f aultVar. Also, only #-tagged
variables are added to de f aultVar (line 33 in Algorithm 2). Hence, v is tagged with #. As is clear from
the algorithm, such a variable is assigned either at line 13 or line 26 in Algorithm 2. Moreover, in both
cases, this variable is generated afresh before constructing the assignment. Hence, v is assigned only
once. Let this assignment location be S. It suffices to show that S dominates L (Location A dominates
location B is every path from the entry block to B goes through A). We will prove this using strong
induction on the blocks sorted in the topological order (making it a well founded set). For the sake of
convenience, let us say that S and L are basic blocks. Hence, the statement that we will prove is the
following.
Lemma 1. P(B)→ expr can be substituted by v in block B⇒ S dominates B.
Proof. Since S dominates itself, P(S) is trivially true. Now, consider P(B). When we arrive at block
B in the second pass, we have already processed all predecessors of B since we process blocks in the
topological order. Let t =ComputeHash(expr).
Lemma 2. expr can be substituted by v in block B⇒ nonNullExprs[B] contains t.
Proof. Substitution occurs at line 18 of Algorithm 3, which can only be reached if line 17 holds.
Now, for nonNullExprs[B] to contain t, nonNullExprs[blk] should also contain t for all blocks blk ∈
B.Preds, i.e. all predecessors of B. This follows from line 19 in Algorithm 2.
Lemma 3. nonNullExprs[B] contains t⇒ S dominates B.
Proof. We show Lemma 3 using strong induction on the blocks sorted in topological order. Clearly,
Lemma 3 holds for S, as nonNullExprs[S] contains t and S dominates itself. Since nonNullExprs[B]
contains t, we know, due to line 19 in Algorithm 2, that nonNullExprs[blk] contains t for all predecessors
blk of B. Now, by induction hypothesis, since the lemma holds for all predecessors of B, S dominates all
predecessors of B. This implies that S dominates B.
Lemmas 2 and 3 together imply Lemma 1, which is a reformulation of the first condition of the proof
of correctness.
A.2 Second Condition
Let us now prove the second condition.
Lemma 4. If two expressions e1 and e2 at locations L1 and L2 respectively evaluate to the same term
t =ComputeHash(e1) =ComputeHash(e2), then e1 at L1 and e2 at L2 evaluate to the same value under
all program executions.
Proof. We prove this lemma by an outer induction on the structure of the expression, and an inner
induction on the blocks sorted in the topological order. First, we prove this lemma when e1 and e2 are
both variables. The map hashValue stores the terms corresponding to each variable in a particular block.
Therefore, ComputeHash(e1) = hashValue[e1 ], which implies hashValue[L1 ][e1] = hashValue[L2 ][e2].
Also, by line 20 in Algorithm 2, we know that for a block B, hashValue[B] contains a variable v only
if it evaluates to the same term in all its predecessors. By the inner induction hypothesis, this means
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that v evaluates to the same value in each predecessor. Also, whenever a statement of form “y := x” is
encountered, the term for x is assigned to y. Since this is the only way that two variables can have the
same term, we have the proof of Lemma 4 for variables.
Now, consider the case when e1 and e2 are arbitrary expressions. Suppose e1 has the form v1.f,
while e2 has the form v2.g. Since ComputeHash(e1) = ComputeHash(e2), we know that f = g, and
ComputeHash(v1) =ComputeHash(v2). This is easy to see from the fact that whenever hashFunction
is updated (line 31 in Algorithm 3), a new term is added to it. Now, by the outer induction hypothesis,
we have that v1 and v2 evaluate to the same value in all executions and since f = g, we have that e1 and
e2 evaluate to the same value under all executions. That concludes the proof of Lemma 4.
Essentially, Lemma 4 entails that term is an abstract representation of the value of an expression.
Going back to our original proof of correctness, the variable v substitutes expression expr (at line 18
in Algorithm 3) only when v = de f aultVar[L][ComputeHash(expr)]. Also, de f aultVar is updated only
when an assignment of the form v := expr is encountered (line 33 in Algorithm 3), and before this update,
ProcessStmt is called on the assignment. This sets hashValue[S][v] =ComputeHash(expr). Combining
the two arguments above, we have
ComputeHash(v) at S = ComputeHash(expr) at L
ComputeHash(v) at L = ComputeHash(expr) at L
The last line follows from the fact that v is tagged with #, hence it is assigned only once, and it is
available at L due to the first condition in the proof of correctness. With the two conditions proved, we
have that the transformation introduced in Algorithm 2 produces a semantically equivalent program, and
executing an alias analysis algorithm on the new program will not add any false positives.
